The Value of Not Knowing:
Notes on Dr. Ralf Jox’s Lecture on Disorders of Consciousness After Severe Brain Injury
By Thomas Lee Abshier, ND | 06 October 2026
Watch the original lecture: The Conundrum of the Uncertain Consciousness: Tackling Emerging Ethical Issues in Patients with Severe Brain Injuries — 2026 Curtis R. Holzgang Memorial Visiting Scholar Lectureship, Providence Center for Health Care Ethics, October 6, 2026. Providence Grand Rounds video playlist
Why I am writing about this lecture
I attend Providence lectures for my continuing medical education, and I am grateful that Providence makes them available in person, live online, and by recording. This session was the 2026 Curtis R. Holzgang Memorial Visiting Scholar Lectureship, hosted by the Providence Center for Health Care Ethics in partnership with the St. Vincent Medical Foundation and broadcast live from Providence St. Vincent Medical Center.
The morning began with a tribute. Kevin Dirksen, Director of the Ethics Center and holder of the Andy and Bev Hansel Endowed Chair in Applied Health Care Ethics, honored Dr. Curtis Holzgang, who died this past summer. Dr. Holzgang was the longtime director of critical care medicine at St. Vincent and associate medical director, later emeritus faculty, of its internal medicine residency. He was remembered as a devoted internist and master teacher who taught by example, whose bedside teaching was known as “Holzgang rounds,” and who cared deeply about the relationship between a patient and his healer. In 2001 he helped found the Providence Center for Health Care Ethics, and he served on its advisory board until his death, proud especially of its Clinical Ethics Fellowship.
The lecturer was Dr. Ralf Jox, Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, and head of the Institute of Humanities in Medicine at Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV). He studied medicine, philosophy, and medical ethics in Freiburg and Munich, at Harvard Medical School, and at King’s College London, and he is board certified in both neurology and palliative medicine. His work spans medical decision-making, autonomy and equity, the ethics of biotechnology and artificial intelligence, neuroethics, and clinical ethics support. He serves on the Swiss National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics, co-edits Springer Nature’s Advances in Neuroethics series, and directs the International Conference on Clinical Ethics and Consultation. He is the lectureship’s first returning scholar, having first come in 2017. Mr. Dirksen shared that when he told Dr. Holzgang that Dr. Jox would return, Dr. Holzgang was thrilled. Dr. Jox, in turn, recalled warmly his conversations with Dr. Holzgang about the Holzgang family’s Swiss roots.
What follows is my organized summary of the lecture, with my own commentary in a clearly marked section. I have paraphrased throughout, and any errors are mine, not Dr. Jox’s. This was a profound lecture on one of the deepest questions in medicine, and I encourage every reader to watch it.
In brief. Some people survive severe brain injury in states where they show little or no sign of awareness. For decades medicine assumed such patients were unconscious. Brain-imaging research now shows that a meaningful minority can understand and respond inwardly even when their bodies cannot. That discovery multiplies the uncertainties: about diagnosis, about prognosis, about treatment, and about what the patient himself would want. Dr. Jox argued that we should work hard to reduce these uncertainties, but also that some uncertainty has real value. It keeps us humble, keeps us searching, and leaves room for human freedom, responsibility, and hope.
The case of Michele
Dr. Jox opened with a case from his own ethics consultation practice in Lausanne. Michele, a 32-year-old Italian-born man, had been in a vegetative state for seven years after a motorcycle accident. He lived in a specialized nursing facility and was admitted to the hospital’s intensive care unit for the third time in a few years, now with pneumonia.
The head of the ICU called for an ethics consultation. He considered further treatment medically futile: he did not want to continue antibiotics or life-sustaining treatment, and he wanted to refuse future ICU admissions. Michele’s family, his parents and two brothers originally from Sicily, pleaded to keep him alive. They saw value in his life and in simply being near him. They had found new research challenging the dogma that all such patients are unconscious and asked the team to look at it. Michele had no advance directive, but the family was sure he would want to live, because he had always lived for the sake of his family and loved them deeply.
The case, Dr. Jox said, shows all the uncertainties he would address: whether such patients are conscious, what they experience, what their prognosis is, and what they would wish.
How these conditions came to be recognized
In the 1960s, Fred Plum and Jerome Posner, in The Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma, observed that the limits of consciousness are hard to define and that we can only infer another person’s self-awareness from his appearance and acts. That is true of every human interaction: I know you are aware only by looking at you and talking with you.
The patients themselves are a product of modern technology. The 1960s brought the first successful cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the 1968 Harvard definition of brain death, and feeding tubes that allow people to live for many years with artificial nutrition and hydration. In 1972, Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum first described the persistent vegetative state: vegetative functions preserved, higher cognitive functions irreversibly lost. The case of Karen Ann Quinlan followed in 1975, and bioethics, Dr. Jox noted, has been accompanied by these questions from its very beginning. Later came recognition of the minimally conscious state, an intermediate condition in which a person cannot communicate functionally but shows some signs of awareness or response, later divided into MCS-plus and MCS-minus. The case of Terri Schiavo in the United States brought these questions to public attention.
The traditional picture was simple. The evolutionarily older brainstem maintains breathing, circulation, hormonal balance, and sleep-wake cycles, and it is relatively resistant to injury and lack of oxygen. The younger cortex supports cognition, language, perception, will, and awareness, and it is more vulnerable. A patient with an intact brainstem and a damaged cortex would therefore have sleep-wake cycles but no consciousness.
The current picture, Dr. Jox explained, is a trajectory. After severe brain injury a person usually begins in coma, which typically lasts only a few weeks. Next may come the vegetative state, now often called unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, in which sleep-wake cycles return but there is no response to stimuli. With recovery come the minimally conscious states, then emergence, with renewed responsiveness and perhaps communication but often severe disability, and, for the fortunate, full recovery. Alongside this path lies a newly recognized condition: cognitive motor dissociation.
The discovery of covert consciousness
In 2006, Adrian Owen and colleagues reported in Science on a young woman in a clinically confirmed vegetative state. In a functional MRI scanner she was asked to imagine playing tennis, and the supplementary motor area of her brain activated just as in healthy volunteers. Asked to imagine walking from room to room in her house, she activated the brain regions for spatial navigation, again as healthy people do. She had evidently understood the instructions and carried them out in her mind. The hypothesis was that her motor output was blocked, but she was conscious.
Later research confirmed and extended the finding. A study in the New England Journal of Medicine used the same mental-imagery tasks with 54 patients with disorders of consciousness. Five could willfully modulate their brain activity, and the investigators turned the tasks into a yes-or-no code (imagine tennis for yes, imagine walking through your house for no). They asked biographical questions, such as whether the patient’s father’s name was Alexander, and at least one patient answered consistently and correctly. A large study, also in the New England Journal of Medicine, examined 241 patients behaviorally diagnosed in coma, the vegetative state, or the minimally conscious state without command-following. About a quarter showed responses to commands on fMRI or EEG. Those patients tended to be younger and further out from their injury, many months after it.
This research, Dr. Jox said, revolutionized the field and deepened every uncertainty surrounding it.
Four kinds of uncertainty
1. Diagnostic uncertainty
Diagnosis remains clinical, and drawing lines on a spectrum is hard. The gold standard, the Coma Recovery Scale–Revised, is an observational scale that is time-consuming, requires training, and is not used everywhere. Reported misdiagnosis rates reach about 40%, partly because many places lack experts. In one German study, even neurologists failed to recognize the vegetative state in 21% of cases, an alarming figure. Functional imaging and artificial intelligence may improve diagnostic precision, but uncertainty remains large.
Beneath diagnosis lies a deeper problem: there is no universal agreement, in medicine or philosophy, on what consciousness is or where its biological basis lies, and no objective test for it other than communication. A sleeping person and a person in a vegetative state can look the same. Dr. Jox stressed a crucial point: absence of proof of awareness is not proof of absence of awareness. Confusing the two is a major cognitive bias. Uncertainty about consciousness extends even to anesthesia, sleep, early embryonic development, and, for some, brain death. In a 2014 survey he and colleagues conducted among Canadian and German neurological experts, more than half believed patients in a vegetative state might feel pain, touch, or even hunger and thirst, while others disagreed. Expert opinion was neither unanimous nor near zero.
This matters enormously to families, because we treat and speak to a conscious person differently. In a 2012 paper, Dr. Jox and colleagues weighed what happens when imaging reveals more awareness than the bedside exam suggested. The benefits could be great: a better prognosis, changed management, pain relief, intensified rehabilitation. But there are risks as well: false hope in families and clinicians, leading to long-term frustration and suffering for the family and perhaps for the patient. Practical questions follow:
- Advanced imaging and quantitative EEG are expensive, complex, scarce, and unavailable to many patients, some of whom cannot even be moved into a scanner. Who should be tested?
- Should testing be done once, or serially?
- If a behaviorally unresponsive patient shows covert consciousness, should he receive analgesics, and which ones, at what doses? Should rehabilitation intensify? Should we speak to him differently?
- Is there an obligation to provide brain-computer interfaces, which are more costly and complex still?
2. Prognostic and therapeutic uncertainty
These disorders are rare, about 2 to 5 per 100,000 people, and relatively new, which makes research difficult. Consent is hard to obtain, and there are, to Dr. Jox’s knowledge, no systematic registries or large cohort studies beyond those he described. Retrospective data suggest that 10% to 24% of patients in the vegetative state regain consciousness, though usually with severe disability, which raises its own question: is that outcome what the person would have wanted?
Two opposite biases distort prognosis. The self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when a pessimistic prognosis leads to withdrawal of treatment, which then confirms the prognosis. The case-report bias arises from wishful thinking, when rare miraculous recoveries reported in the media or in journals become the cornerstone of a family’s hope. The first leads to therapeutic nihilism; the second to therapeutic adventurism.
Access to specialized rehabilitation is also profoundly unequal. Maps from the International Brain Injury Association show such centers clustered in large Eastern U.S. cities, and in Europe concentrated in northern Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, with very few in France, Spain, or England.
A recent German evidence-based (S3) guideline, which Dr. Jox helped write, found that some interventions can promote the emergence or increase of consciousness, including amantadine, zolpidem, and multisensory stimulation programs. That raises a profound ethical question. If a patient becomes conscious, he may also become aware of pain, hunger, thirst, and his own dependency and disability. Is that consistent with the duty to do no harm? The guideline’s answer was that the goal should still be to improve the patient’s level of consciousness, accompanied by continuous assessment of benefit and risk. Being able to intervene does not by itself make intervention better. Consciousness enables both good experiences, such as listening to music, and bad ones, such as pain. But the guideline gave three reasons to favor restoring consciousness:
- Consciousness is both a sign of and a contributor to broader neurological recovery, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral.
- Consciousness is the condition for distinctly human experience: communication, agency, moral life, and dignity.
- Conscious persons are more likely to be treated with respect, to have their rights honored, and to participate in society.
3. Patient-related uncertainty
The last kind of uncertainty concerns the patient himself.
- Well-being depends on personal factors, on each person’s capacity to adapt to disability (which is very hard to predict), and on his social environment of family and caregivers.
- Epistemic injustice arises when families’ observations of recovery or emerging responses are dismissed by professionals, even though families often spend far more time at the bedside.
- Presumed wishes are hard to know. These are usually young people with sudden injuries and no advance care planning. By definition they lack decision-making capacity, since capacity is judged through communication. Some have asked whether a brain-computer interface could assess or even restore capacity, but whether informed consent can be given through such a device has not been established, and lawyers would likely say no. Consent for research in this population, usually by surrogates, is especially complex; Dr. Jox has written on it with the Curing Coma Campaign of the Neurocritical Care Society.
Can artificial intelligence help?
AI is not a deus ex machina, Dr. Jox said, but it can help: machine learning can better distinguish diagnostic categories, help detect covert consciousness with fMRI and EEG, and improve prognostic prediction. The harder question is whether AI should support decisions about what a patient would want.
He described a proof-of-principle study by his group using data from a long-running Swiss cohort of older adults who were periodically asked whether they would want resuscitation after cardiac arrest, and whose partners were asked to predict their answers. Long-married partners, over 55, predicted correctly only 58.7% of the time. A machine-learning model using only sociodemographic data did better, around 68% to 69%, and richer models adding health-record behaviors (such as vaccination and screening) and personality traits and general wishes did better still. Yet Dr. Jox and the accompanying editorial both asked whether greater accuracy alone justifies using such a tool.
The value of uncertainty
The heart of the lecture was Dr. Jox’s thesis: reducing uncertainty remains an important goal, but in disorders of consciousness it must be complemented by an approach wrongly thought paradoxical, an appreciation of the fundamental value of uncertainty, both for knowledge and for morality.
We can and should reduce uncertainty, with examinations, imaging, EEG, and evoked potentials; second opinions and interprofessional boards like oncology tumor boards; watchful waiting and time-limited trials; clinical ethics consultation; and advance care planning, which ideally everyone would do early. Certainty helps decision-makers bear responsibility, eases distress, supports autonomous choices, and reduces error and regret.
Yet uncertainty always remains, and people often deny it, persuading themselves, sometimes deceiving themselves, that all will be well or all will be lost. Clinicians rarely say openly to families, “I don’t know whether he will recover.” We cope through supervision, peer groups, coaching, and chaplaincy.
A thought experiment. Imagine perfect certainty about every aspect of a decision. Decisions could then be made instantly, even automatically, without a human decision-maker. Hope and fear would become meaningless, and with them the motivation that drives treatment and recovery.
So, Dr. Jox argued, remaining uncertainty has value:
- Epistemic value. Uncertainty expresses our condition as beings who live in time and freedom. We never know what tomorrow brings; the future is open, and a new treatment may be discovered tomorrow. Doubt keeps us searching for knowledge and truth, underlies science and philosophy, and teaches the virtue of epistemic humility.
- Moral value. He illustrated this with a second case. Arvind and Azad were Kurdish freedom fighters in Syria who came to Switzerland seeking asylum. When their children were four and six, Azad suffered a ruptured aneurysm and, months later, was in a vegetative state. Physicians proposed withdrawing life support as futile. Arvind objected, pointing to prognostic uncertainty and his wife’s presumed wishes, and moved her to a care facility. When Dr. Jox met him three years later, his wife had died. Arvind told him he had never regretted continuing treatment. He had been uncertain, but so were the physicians, if they were honest. His hopes had not come true, but that is life. He knew it was his wife’s wish, and the time they still had together was worthwhile. None of us knows the future, he said; good decisions take time and cannot be accelerated by an efficient algorithm, and if we want to stay human, we must take that time and help one another with such decisions.
Dr. Jox concluded that it is precisely because we are uncertain that we must decide and take responsibility. Without uncertainty, a specific response would follow deterministically from a specific situation, with no need for a free and responsible human person. A basic degree of uncertainty is a prerequisite of moral agency and of morality itself. We should try to reduce uncertainty, and at the same time appreciate its moral value.
From the question period
Advance care planning in primary care. An online questioner, a primary care physician, asked whether advance care planning and goals-of-care conversations should move upstream into primary care, and how to train clinicians. Dr. Jox agreed. In Switzerland his colleagues are building a comprehensive, facilitated form of advance care planning that is far more than checking a box, and that invites even young people to think through difficult scenarios such as sudden brain injury from a skiing or motorcycle accident. It cannot be forced, but it should be offered, and that is an important task for primary care physicians, nurses, and others.
The view from the long-term care facility. Dr. Laura Perry, a geriatrician, asked how the clinicians at Michele’s nursing facility, who had known him for years, saw the case. She recalled a nursing home patient of her own who recovered very slowly after a profound brain injury, and how she often disagreed with hospital clinicians who saw only a brief snapshot. Dr. Jox said a second ethics consultation had included the long-term care physician, also a geriatrician, who had a completely different perspective. He noted that the ICU physician’s view may have been shaped in part by a more secular cultural background and perhaps by the pressures of running a busy ICU with a waiting list. In the end it was accepted that Michele would receive the ICU treatment he needed for the acute illness, with certain limits set, including a do-not-resuscitate order.
Honesty without burdening families. Mr. Dirksen, drawing together questions from palliative care colleagues, observed that clinicians sometimes become tentative when communicating uncertainty, and asked how to avoid shifting the burden of uncertainty onto families, and whether new technologies might reveal not only consciousness but signs of suffering. Dr. Jox agreed that pushing uncertainty onto families is not ethically right. Today’s patients and families are well informed and should be partners in a dialogue of shared decision-making about what is known and unknown. Families sometimes know more, bringing a study the physician had not seen, or observations made during the long hours they spend at the bedside. Clinicians and families should work together to reduce uncertainty, while being honest and realistic about its limits: “I have experience, and there are data, but I do not know everything.” That, he said, is how to proceed, in partnership and in care.
My reflections
This section is my own commentary, not part of the lecture.
This was one of the most thoughtful lectures I have heard. Dr. Jox brought together the precision of a neurologist, the compassion of a palliative care physician, and the depth of a philosopher, and he did so with humility. It was a fitting tribute to Dr. Holzgang, whose life was devoted to the relationship between patient and healer.
Three lessons stay with me.
First, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The discovery that roughly one in four outwardly unresponsive patients may be able to follow commands inwardly should change how every clinician and family member speaks and acts at the bedside. If a person might be hearing, we should speak to him as someone who is present, with gentleness, respect, and hope. The cost of treating a conscious person as absent is far greater than the cost of treating an unconscious person as present.
Second, families are witnesses, not obstacles. Both of Dr. Jox’s cases centered on families who loved the patient and refused to accept a verdict of futility. Michele’s family brought research to the team; Arvind kept faith with his wife’s wishes. Dr. Perry’s question and Dr. Jox’s answer reminded us that those who spend months and years at the bedside often see what a brief hospital snapshot cannot. Listening to families is not only kind; it is good medicine.
Third, uncertainty calls us to humility and to responsibility. I was deeply moved by Dr. Jox’s argument that uncertainty is not merely a defect to be engineered away, but part of what makes us free and moral beings. As a Christian, I hear in it an ancient truth: “Whereas ye know not what shall be on the morrow” (James 4:14). We are not given to know the future, and because we do not know it, we must decide with care, accept responsibility for our choices, and walk alongside one another. Arvind’s words, that the time he and his wife still had together was worthwhile and that hard decisions cannot be hurried by an algorithm, carry a wisdom every clinician can learn from.
I am grateful to Dr. Jox for returning to Portland with a lecture of such depth and humanity; to Kevin Dirksen and the Providence Center for Health Care Ethics for hosting it; and to Dr. Holzgang, whose legacy made it possible. Please watch the original.
Questions for families and clinicians, drawn from the lecture
- Has the diagnosis been made by someone experienced, using a standardized tool such as the Coma Recovery Scale–Revised, and repeated over time?
- Could advanced testing (fMRI or EEG) reveal covert awareness, and is it available?
- Are we speaking to the patient as someone who may hear and understand?
- Are comfort and pain being addressed in case he can feel?
- What do the people who know him best, family and long-term caregivers, observe?
- What would he have wanted, and what evidence do we have for that?
- Are we guarding against both therapeutic nihilism and therapeutic adventurism?
- Would a second opinion, an interprofessional review, an ethics consultation, or a time-limited trial help?
- Have I, and those I love, done advance care planning in case of sudden injury?
Editorial notes
These notes clarify points from the lecture for readers who want to follow up. They are mine, not the speaker’s.
- The fMRI yes/no study. The recording gives the year as 2020. The study was Monti, Vanhaudenhuyse, and colleagues, “Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness,” New England Journal of Medicine, February 2010. Of 54 patients, 5 could willfully modulate their brain activity, and one man in his twenties, injured in a car accident at least five years earlier, used the technique to answer yes-or-no questions.
- The cognitive motor dissociation study. The large study of 241 patients is Bodien and colleagues, “Cognitive Motor Dissociation in Disorders of Consciousness,” New England Journal of Medicine, August 2024. Cognitive motor dissociation was detected in 60 of the 241 patients (25%) without observable response to commands, and was associated with younger age, longer time since injury, and traumatic brain injury. The authors noted that detection was most common when both fMRI and EEG were used, suggesting multiple tests may be needed to avoid missing consciousness.
- The original vegetative-state finding. Owen AM, et al., “Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State,” Science, 2006.
- The 40% misdiagnosis figure. This figure is widely cited in the literature, including in the Monti 2010 paper.
- Names and dates. Speech-to-text rendered several names phonetically. The correct forms are Ralf Jox, Curtis Holzgang, Bryan Jennett, Karen Ann Quinlan, and Terri Schiavo. The introduction’s reference to a “2027” visit is a slip for 2017.
Sources
- Providence Center for Health Care Ethics, The Conundrum of the Uncertain Consciousness, Ralf Jox, MD, PhD, 2026 Holzgang Memorial Visiting Scholar Lectureship, October 6, 2026. Providence Grand Rounds playlist; see also the Providence Ethics Videos Collection.
- Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV), Ralf J. Jox, MD, PhD — profile.
- Providence Center for Health Care Ethics.
- Monti MM, Vanhaudenhuyse A, et al. Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness. N Engl J Med. 2010;362:579–89.
- MIT Technology Review, Brain Imaging Lets Vegetative Patient Communicate (2010).
- Bodien YG, et al. Cognitive Motor Dissociation in Disorders of Consciousness. N Engl J Med. 2024;391:598–608.
- University of Cambridge, One in four patients in vegetative or minimally conscious state able to perform cognitive tasks.
- News-Medical, Brain scans can detect consciousness in some unresponsive patients.